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R.I.M. Porter Novelli.
DIRECT MARKETING

Restoring public trust in a production enterprise through the direct distribution of information

Client:  DIROL CADBURY


In 1999, the Danish company Dandy commissioned a chewing gum plant in the town of Veliky Novgorod, which became known as the Dirol plant. In 2002, Dandy’s European operations acquired the Cadbury Schweppes international candy maker. Assuming management of the Dirol plant, Cadbury Schweppes discovered that the enterprise was weighed down with the inheritance of poor plant relations with Veliky Novgorod residents, who viewed the plant as extremely harmful to both their health and the environment. Negative sentiments ran especially high in the Torgovaya District, which the plant neighbored on the outskirts of town.

The plant’s transfer under Cadbury Schweppes’ management coincided with a severe deterioration of the conflict. It was the new owners who had to absorb the main consequences of the population’s pent-up fury, which was expressed in a wave of complaints to various authorities, antagonism from the local elite, and media criticism. According to preliminary social survey results, the Dirol plant was identified as the region’s worst environmental polluter by 42 percent of Veliky Novgorod residents. Sixteen percent called it the most damaging enterprise to their health. These public sentiments do not correspond to the actual state of affairs, since the Dirol plant’s "contribution" to environmental pollution – which stood at 27 tons of pollutants per year – comprised just 0.088 percent of the total volume of pollutants released into the city’s atmosphere by the city’s other enterprises and transportation.

The reasons for conflict involved mistrust in a "foreign" company, the absence of public information, and the local residents’ irrational thinking. For example, members of the project’s working group heard professors of Veliky Novgorod University say things such as "We had to build in an oncological center because of the plant!" They were referring to a center that was commissioned three years prior to the plant’s appearance in the city. Finally, an important factor involved the smell emitted by the plant’s aromatic components: the plant’s environmental conservation equipment fully corresponded to existing regulations, but did not provide for the suppression of aromatic substance emissions, which were released into the atmosphere in very low concentrations (the annual aromatic substance emissions per resident living in the exposure zone corresponded to the aromatic components contained in a 100-gram bottle of perfume). However, since they are directly intended to carry a "strong smell", these substances are detected by humans in concentrates of just a few molecules per a cubic meter of air. This truly did pose a real inconvenience to residents of the exposure zone, even through these components were in no way harmful to people’s health. Moreover, the organization of the plant’s communications was inadequate for the situation: the head office’s location in Moscow meant that information had to be received there as well.

This was critical for the local media and deprived local residents of the opportunity to make direct contact with the plant, or to receive direct feedback. Furthermore, the central office did not even have a media relations department or a PR service. This, in turn, predetermined the company’s passive public position – its lack of resources meant that company communications were reduced to simply “reacting” to events, without being able to take professional stock of the particularities its operations in the region involved.